The prevailing literature discusses intergenerational trade-offs predominantly in infinitely-lived agent models despite the finite lifetime of individuals. We discuss these trade-offs in a continuous time OLG framework and relate the results to the infinitely-lived agent setting. We identify three shortcomings of the latter: First, underlying normative assumptions about social preferences cannot be deduced unambiguously. Second, the distribution among generations living at the same time cannot be captured. Third, the optimal solution may not be implementable in overlapping generations market economies. Regarding the recent debate on climate change, we conclude that it is indispensable to explicitly consider the generations' life cycles.
Introduction
How much should a government invest in public infrastructure or in basic research? And how much should society invest in greenhouse gas mitigation? These decision problems exhibit two important common characteristics: a classical public good problem and an intergenerational equity trade-off. The public good problem requires governmental intervention to restore efficiency. However, doing so inevitably involves a distributional choice between current and future generations. Most models address the distributional component using an infinitely-lived agent (ILA) framework where the utility of the ILA is interpreted as a utilitarian social welfare function. The current literature offers two distinct answers how to specify the parameter values of this welfare function. The "positive" approach suggests a calibration-based procedure that attempts to avoid explicit normative assumptions. By contrast, the normative approach takes the standpoint that only ethical considerations are valid to address the intergenerational trade-off. These two approaches generally lead to significantly different results that can be traced back to the difference in the implied social discount rate. Barro (1974) shows that, under appropriate assumptions on altruism implying operational bequests, finitely lived generations can be aggregated into a representative ILA.
Recent empirical studies, however, indicate that the altruistic bequest motive is rather weak. 1 These findings suggest that an overlapping generations (OLG) model without altruistic bequests would better fit reality. If so, is it appropriate to use an ILA specification to discuss intergenerational equity trade-offs?
In this paper, we answer these questions by examining the relationship between an OLG model in continuous time and the standard ILA economy (i.e., Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy). We point out various short-comings of the ILA assumption and discuss positive and normative aspects of the distributional problem by disentangling the life plans of finitely-lived individuals from the long-run plans of a social planner. First, we construct an unregulated decentralized OLG economy of finitely-lived agents in continuous time.
We determine the conditions for which a decentralized OLG economy is observationally equivalent to, i.e., exhibits the same macroeconomic observables as, an ILA economy. In particular, we explain why and how the preference parameters of the individual households in the decentralized OLG economy differ from those in the observationally equivalent ILA economy. Second, we introduce a social planner who maximizes the discounted life time utilities of the OLG as, e.g., Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) or Burton (1993) . We show that this utilitarian OLG economy is observationally equivalent to an appropriately chosen ILA economy. However, the distribution of consumption between old and young at any given point in time differs substantially from that of the decentralized economy if the rate of time preference (or generational discount rate) of the social planner is lower than that of the individual households. In this case the utilitarian OLG model implies a trade-off between equality among the generations living at the same time and equality of lifetime utilities between present and future generations. Third, we find that in the OLG context the ability to decentralize the social planner's solution is limited. In a constrained setting, in which age-discriminating taxes are not available to governments, the constrained social planner generally cannot achieve the first-best social optimum.
We apply our results to the recent debate on climate change mitigation. We identify the implicit normative assumptions in the positive approach to social discounting, as, for example, advocated by Nordhaus (2007) . In particular, we point out that, in general, the positive approach to specify the social welfare function implicitly assumes that the time preference rate of the social planner exceeds the one of the individual households.
This contrasts sharply with most of the ethical arguments found in the debate. The normative approach to social discounting, as followed by Stern (2007) , employs an ILA model with a near zero rate of time preference expressing the desire to treat generations equally. However, the ILA model does not capture the distribution of consumption among generations alive at a given point in time. The utilitarian OLG model implies that a more equal treatment of lifetime utilities between present and future generations can come at the expense of a more unequal treatment of the generations alive at a given point in time -at least if individuals possess a positive rate of pure time preference.
There are several other papers that examine the relationship between ILA and OLG models. Aiyagari (1985) proved that under certain assumptions in discrete time an OLG model with two-period lived individuals is observationally equivalent to an ILA model.
For the continuous time setting, Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) observed this equivalence for the social planner solution in an OLG setting with finitely lived agents. While the latter focus on time inconsistencies in fiscal policy, our focus is on intergenerational trade-offs.
Formally, our OLG model most closely relates to d'Albis (2007) who examines the influence of demographic structure on capital accumulation and growth. In contrast to d'Albis (2007), we allow for exogenous technological change. In contrast to both of the above continuous time OLG models, we assume deterministic rather than stochastic life-times. Moreover, we provide an explicit mapping between the two frameworks with respect to the rates of time preference and the intertemporal elasticities of substitution.
Our combination of continuous time and deterministic finite life-time also distinguishes our framework from the most widespread continuous time OLG framework by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) , which features a constant probability of death and, thus, an infinite planning horizon. Several environmental economic applications, including Howarth (1998), Howarth (2000) , Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) , Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2000) , and Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (1997) , observed that ILA models can be calibrated to yield outcomes similar to OLG models. These papers use numerical simulations of integrated assessment models, whereas we derive the analytical relation between the decentralized OLG economy in continuous time and the ILA economy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop a decentralized OLG model in continuous time. The ILA economy is introduced in Section 3. We derive conditions for observational equivalence of the decentralized OLG economy and an ILA model in Section 4. In Section 5, we examine the relationship between the latter and two social planner solutions, unconstrained and constrained. We apply our results to the recent debate on climate change mitigation in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
An OLG Growth Model in Continuous Time
We introduce an OLG exogenous growth model in continuous time and analyze the longrun individual and aggregate dynamics of a decentralized economy in market equilibrium.
Households
Consider a continuum of households, each living the finite time span T . All households exhibit the same intertemporal preferences irrespective of their time of birth s ∈ (−∞, ∞).
We assume that if households are altruistic, their altruistic preferences are not sufficiently strong for an operative bequest motive. This allows us to abstract from altruism in individual preferences. As a consequence, all households maximize their own welfare U , which is the discounted stream of instantaneous utility derived from consumption during their lifetime
where c(t, s) is the consumption at calender time t of households born at time s, σ H is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ H denotes the constant rate of (pure) time preference of the households. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor at any time alive, which is supplied inelastically to the labor market at wage w(t). In addition, households may save and borrow assets b(t, s) at the interest r(t). The household's budget constraint is 2
Households are born without assets and are not allowed to be indebted at time of death.
Thus, the following boundary conditions apply for all generations s
Because of the non-operative bequest motive, intertemporal welfare U of a household born at time s always increases in consumption at time s + T . Thus, in the household optimum, the second boundary condition in equation (3) holds with equality.
Maximizing equation (1) for any given s subject to conditions (2) and (3) yields the well known Euler equatioṅ
The behavior of a household born at time s is characterized by the system of differential equations (2) and (4) and the boundary conditions for the asset stock (3).
At any time t ∈ (−∞, ∞) the size of the population N (t) increases at the constant rate ν ≥ 0. Normalizing the population at time t = 0 to unity implies the birth rate γ 3
2 Throughout the paper, partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts (e.g., Observe that γ → 1/T for ν → 0 and γ → ν for T → ∞. Anticipating definition (12), we can also write γ = 1/QT (ν).
Firms
Consider a continuum of identical competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1]. All firms produce a homogeneous consumption good under conditions of perfect competition from capital k (t, i) and effective labor A(t)l (t, i) . A(t) characterizes the technological level of the economy and grows exogenously at a constant rate ξ. Normalizing technological progress at t = 0 to unity implies
All firms have access to the same production technology F (k(t, i), A(t)l(t, i)), which exhibits constant returns to scale and positive but strictly decreasing marginal productivity with respect to both inputs capital and effective labor. Furthermore, F satisfies the Inada conditions.
Constant returns to scale of the production function and symmetry of the firms allow us to work with a representative firm whose decision variables are interpreted as aggregate variables. With minor abuse of notation, we introduce aggregate capital per effective labor, k(t), and aggregate capital per capita,k(t),
In addition, we define the intensive form production function f k(t) ≡ F k(t), 1 .
Profit maximization of the representative firm yields for the wage w(t) and the interest rate r(t)
Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Dynamics
In order to investigate the aggregate dynamics of the economy, we introduce aggregate household variables per effective labor by integrating over all living individuals and dividing by the product of technological level and the labor force of the economy. Analogously to equation (7) we define under slight abuse of notation per effective labor household variables, x(t), and aggregate household variables per capita,x(t),
where x(t, s) stands for the individual household variables consumption c(t, s) and assets b(t, s).
The economy consists of three markets: the labor market, the capital market and the consumption good market. We assume the economy to be in market equilibrium at all times t. In consequence, labor demand equals the population size, i.e., 1 0 l(t, i) di = N (t), and capital in terms of effective labor equals aggregate assets in terms of effective labor, i.e., k(t) = b(t). Then, the aggregate dynamics imply 4
where the term
captures the difference in aggregate consumption per effective labor between the generation born and the generation dying at time t.
Steady State
Our analysis will concentrate on the long-run steady state growth path of the economy, in which both consumption per effective labor and capital per effective labor are constant over time, i.e., c(t) = c ⋆ , k(t) = k ⋆ . From equations (8) For T ∈ R ++ we define the function Q T : R → R + as
and 
Figure 1 illustrates these steady state paths for individual consumption and assets in terms of the technological level of the economy. 5 The individual consumption path grows exponentially over the lifetime of each generation. Individual household assets follow an inverted U-shape, i.e., households are born with no assets, accumulate assets in their youth and consume their wealth towards their death.
5 The calculations use the following model specifications:
Applying the aggregation rule (9), we obtain for the aggregate values per effective labor
The following proposition guarantees the existence of a non-trivial steady state for a large class of production functions, in particular, CES-production functions.
Proposition 1 (Existence of the steady state)
There exists a k ⋆ > 0 solving equations (8) and (14) with
The proof is given in the appendix.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that steady states may be equal to or larger than the golden rule capital stock k gr , which is implicitly defined by r gr ≡ ν + ξ = f ′ (k gr ). As our aim is to compare the decentralized OLG with an ILA economy, we are particularly interested in steady states with k ⋆ < k gr . 6
Definition 1 (Decentralized OLG economy) 
There exists exactly one
and, in case that σ H > 1,
Although we cannot solve the implicit equation k ⋆ = b ⋆ analytically and, therefore, cannot calculate the steady state interest rate r ⋆ , the following proposition determines a lower bound of the steady state interest rates in a dynamically efficient OLG economy.
Proposition 3 (Lower bound of steady state interest rate)
For any economy Γ * holds
The lower bound of the steady state interest rate in the decentralized OLG economy will play an important role for the comparison with the ILA economy.
Infinitely-Lived Agent Economy and Observational Equivalence
As intergenerational trade-offs are mostly discussed in ILA frameworks rather than in 
subject to the budget constrainṫ
and the transversality condition
Maximizing (19) subject to (20) and (21) 
Making use of equation (22a) we know that in a steady state the transversality condition translates into
In the following we assume that the transversality condition is met. Note that it is the strict version for the Ramsey agent of the dynamic efficiency condition for the household in the OLG economy.
Assuming markets to be in equilibrium at all times (i.e.,
, the dynamics of the capital stock per effective labor in the ILA economy readṡ
which is formally equivalent to the corresponding equation (10b) 
(ii) Two economies A and B are observationally equivalent in steady state if there exist c ⋆ and k ⋆ such that both economies are in a steady state.
Note that observational equivalence in the steady state (ii) is weaker than general observational equivalence (i).
Decentralized OLG Versus Infinitely-Lived Agent Economy
Now, we investigate under what conditions a decentralized OLG economy, as outlined in Section 2, is observationally equivalent to an ILA economy, as defined in Section 3.
The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient condition:
Proposition 4 (Decentralized OLG versus ILA economy) (i) A decentralized OLG economy Γ ⋆ and an ILA economy are observationally equivalent if and only if for all t ≥ 0 the following condition holds:
(ii) For any decentralized OLG economy Γ ⋆ there exists an ILA economy that is observationally equivalent in the steady state.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 states that any decentralized OLG economy Γ ⋆ is -at least in the steady state -observationally equivalent to an ILA economy for an appropriate choice of
If we assume that the intertemporal propensity to smooth consumption between two periods is the same for the households in the OLG and the ILA economy, i.e., σ H = σ R , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Identical intertemporal elasticity of substitution)
To understand why the pure rates of time preference in the ILA economy differs from the observationally equivalent OLG economy, we analyze the two terms in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (24 
Proposition 5 (Sign of ∆c(t)/c(t)) For any decentralized OLG economy Γ ⋆ ∆c(t)/c(t) > 0 holds if and only iḟ c(t, s) c(t, s) >ċ
Proof: The equivalence between ∆c(t)/c(t) > 0 and (25) is obtained by substituting the individual household's Euler equation (4) into the aggregate Euler equation (10a) and solving for ∆c(t)/c(t).
Note that the right hand side of inequality (25) represents the growth rate of aggregate consumption.
The second term in brackets of equation (24) It follows immediately from Proposition 5 that for σ R = σ H both effects in equation (24) together yield 
Equipping an ILA with a lower intertemporal substitutability than the household in the decentralized OLG economy would ceteris paribus increase the steady state interest rate in the ILA economy (as opposed to the situation whith coinciding elasticities).
In order to match the same observed interest rate as before, the ILA's rate of time preference has to be lower. Thus, the time preference relation can flip around if picking the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the ILA sufficiently below that of the household in the decentralized OLG economy (note that [·] −1 < 1).
Utilitarian OLG Versus Infinitely-Lived Agent Economy
Consider an OLG economy, which is governed by a social planner maximizing a social welfare function. In this section, we investigate the conditions under which this economy is observationally equivalent to an ILA economy. We assume a utilitarian social welfare function in which the social planner trades off the weighted lifetime utility of different generations. The weight consists of two components. First, the lifetime utility of the generation born at time s is weighted by cohort size. Second, the social planner exhibits a social rate of time preference ρ S ≥ 0 at which he discounts the expected lifetime utility at birth for generations born in the future. 8
Assuming that the social planner maximizes social welfare from t = 0 onward, the social welfare function consists of two parts: (i) the weighted integral of the remaining lifetime utility of all generations alive at time t = 0, and (ii) the weighted integral of all future
The term in the first curly braces is the (remaining) lifetime utility U (s) of a household born at time s, as given by equation (1), the functional form of which is a given primitive for the social planner. The term γ exp[νs] denotes the cohort size of the generation born at time s. Changing the order of integration and replacing t − s by age a, we obtain
In the following, we consider two different scenarios. In the unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy, a social planner maximizes the social welfare function (27b) directly controlling investment and household consumption. Thus, the social planner is in command of a centralized economy. In contrast, in the constrained utilitarian OLG economy the social planner relies on a market economy, in which the households optimally control their savings and consumption maximizing their individual lifetime utility (1). In this second scenario, the social planner is constrained to influencing prices by a tax/subsidy regime in order to maximize the social welfare function (27b).
Unconstrained Utilitarian OLG Economy
We determine the unconstrained social planner's optimal allocation by maximizing (27b) subject to the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition
Obstfeld ( 1988) show that social welfare functions which do not treat all present and future generations symmetrically, i.e., discount lifetime utility to the same point of reference (here the date of birth), may lead to time-inconsistent optimal plans.
Following the approach of Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) , we interpret the unconstrained social planner's optimization problem as two nested optimization problems. The first problem is obtained by defining
subject to
The solution to this maximization problem is the social planner's optimal distribution of consumption between all generations alive at time t.
Proposition 6 (Optimal consumption distribution for given time t)
The optimal solution of the maximization problem (29) subject to condition (30) is
As a consequence, all households receive the same amount of consumption at time t irrespective of age for ρ H = ρ S , and receive less consumption the older (younger) they are at a given time t for ρ H > ρ S (ρ H < ρ S ).
Proposition 6 states that the difference between the households' rate of time preference ρ H and the social rate of time preference ρ S determines the social planner's optimal distribution of consumption across households of different age at some given time t. In particular, if ρ H > ρ S the consumption profile with respect to age is qualitatively opposite to that of the decentralized solution at any time t, as following from the Euler equation (4) and illustrated in Figure 2 . 9 That is, in the social planner's solution households receive less consumption the older they are, whereas they would consume more the older they are in the decentralized OLG economy. The intuition for this result is as follows. The social planner weighs the lifetime utility of every individual discounted to 9 We do not take up a stance on the relationship between the individual and the social rate of time preference, but merely hint at the resulting consequences. This is in line with Burton (1993) 
Figure 2: Distribution of consumption across all generations alive at given time t dependent on age a for the decentralized OLG and three different utilitarian OLGs.
the time of birth. Thus, the instantaneous utility at time t of those who are younger (born later) is discounted for a relatively longer time at the social planner's time preference (before birth) and for a relatively shorter time by the individual's time preference (after birth) than is the case for the instantaneous utility at time t of those who are older (born earlier). For ρ H > ρ S the social planner's time preference is smaller and, thus, the young generation's utility at time t receives higher weight. We now turn to the second part of the maximization problem, which optimizesc(t) over time. It is obtained by replacing the term in curly brackets in equation (27b) by the left hand side of equation (29) resulting in
subject to the budget constraint (10b). Observe that problem (32) is formally equivalent to an ILA economy with the instantaneous utility function V c(t) and the time preference rate ρ S . 10 We obtain V c(t) by inserting the optimal consumption profile (31) into equation (29) and carrying out the integration
The social planner's maximization problem (32) 
The proof is given in the appendix. The proof is given in the appendix.
Remark:
The converse of (i) is not true, as there exists no economy Γ * that would be observationally equivalent to an unconstrained utilitarian OLG with ρ S < ρ H .
Proposition 8 implies that an unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy exhibits the same aggregate steady state as the decentralized OLG economy if and only if the intratemporal distribution of consumption between all generations alive coincide. For this to hold, the social planner's rate of time preference has to be higher than the individual households' rate of time preference.
Constrained Utilitarian OLG Economy
As seen in Proposition 8, the optimal solution of a social planner maximizing (27b) subject to the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition (28) is, in general, not identical to the outcome of a decentralized OLG economy. 11 Thus, the question arises whether and if so how the social optimum is implementable in a decentralized market economy. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) show that it is possible to implement the social optimum by a transfer scheme discriminating by date of birth s and age a. Such a transfer scheme may be difficult to implement because of its administrative burden. In addition, it is questionable whether taxes and subsidies which are conditioned on age per se are politically viable. 12
As a consequence, we consider a social planner that cannot discriminate transfers by age but may only influence prices via taxes and subsidies. In particular, we assume that the social planner may impose taxes/subsidies on capital and labor income. Let τ r (t) and τ w (t) denote the tax/subsidy on returns on savings and on labor income, respectively. 13
The individual households of the OLG economy base their optimal consumption and saving decisions on the effective interest rate r e t, τ r (t) and the effective wage w e t, τ w (t) defined by
Then, the individual budget constraint readṡ
11 Recall that we assume the individual preference parameters to be identical in both economies. 12 See also the "Age Discrimination Act of 1975" for the US stating that "...no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Note that programs like medicare use age as a proxy for the health condition and do not discriminate by age per se. 13 Following the standard convention, τi(t) is positive if it is a tax and negative if it is a subsidy.
Given this budget constraint, individual households choose consumption paths which maximize lifetime utility (1). Thus, the optimal consumption path c e t, s, {r(t ′ ), τ r (t ′ ), τ w (t ′ )} s+T t ′ =s is a function of the paths of the interest rate r(t) and the taxes τ r (t) and τ w (t).
Note that for a given path of the interest rate and given tax/subsidy schemes {r(t), τ r (t), τ w (t)} s+T t=s the individual household's optimal paths of consumption and assets can be characterized as in the decentralized OLG economy by (2) and (4) when using r e t, τ r (t) and w e t, τ w (t) instead of r(t) and w(t), respectively. Applying the aggregation rule (9) yields aggregate consumption per effective labor c e t, {r(
To analyze observational equivalence between such a constrained utilitarian OLG economy and an ILA economy, we have to restrict redistribution to mechanisms which do not alter the aggregate budget constraint (10b) of the economy. We consider the following redistribution scheme which yields a balanced government budget at all times
Under these conditions the social optimum is, in general, not implementable.
Proposition 9 (Implementation of the social optimum) The optimal solution of a social planner maximizing (27b) subject to the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition (28) is not implementable by a tax/subsidy regime satisfying (35) unless this solution is identical to the outcome of the unregulated decentralized OLG economy Γ ⋆ .
Proposition 9 states that a constrained social planner who can only impose a tax/subsidy regime on interest and wages cannot achieve the first-best social optimum. The intuition is that the constrained social planner can achieve the socially optimal aggregate levels of capital and consumption, but cannot implement the socially optimal intratemporal distribution of consumption across generations living at the same time. The only exception occurs if the social optimum happens to be identical to the outcome of the unregulated OLG economy. In this case, there is no need for the social planner to interfere and, thus, it does not matter whether the social planner can freely re-distribute consumption among generations or is constrained to a self-financing tax/subsidy scheme. In all other cases, the constrained social planner will choose a tax path such as to achieve a secondbest optimum. In consequence, Proposition 9 questions the validity of the ILA model in deriving distributional policy advice for a democratic government that, most likely, is not able to redistribute by age between the generations alive.
Stern vs. Nordhaus -A Critical Review of Choosing the Social Rate of Time Preference
A prime example for questions of intergenerational equity is the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change, as most of its costs accrue today while the benefits spread over decades or even centuries. The question of optimal greenhouse gas abatement has been analyzed in integrated assessment models combining an ILA economy with a climate model. Interpreting the ILA's utility function (19) as a utilitarian social welfare function, intergenerational equity concerns are closely related to the choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ R and the rate of time preference ρ R . This is illustrated well by In the following, we apply our results derived in Sections 4 and 5 to critically review recent approaches to the evaluation of climate change mitigation scenarios. We focus on the Stern (2007) review, which we consider a paradigm for the normative approach, and its critique by Nordhaus (2007) , which we consider representative for the positive approach. We find that neither Nordhaus' (2007) positive nor Stern's (2007) normative approach spell out all the normative assumptions hidden in their respective descriptions of the intergenerational allocation problem. We identify the implicit assumptions and the shortcomings in the current debate and argue that our analysis lays out a more comprehensive foundation for approaching the valuation problem in the integrated assessment of climate change.
The "positive" approach
The majority of economists in the climate change debate takes an observation-based approach to social discounting. This view is exemplarily laid out in Nordhaus' (2007) critical review of the Stern (2007) tion than does the procedure of calibration and extrapolation followed by the positive approach of, e.g., Nordhaus (2007) . A problem with the positive approach is that the normative content of the preferences assigned to the social planner is concealed. The literature estimating intertemporal substitutability in approaches that disentangle intertemporal substitutability from risk aversion precisely suggests such an increase. If we follow Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) building on Epstein and Zin (1991) and Campbell (1996) the authors give us a best guess of σ = 1.5, which is also part of a parameter constellation best explaining the equity premium puzzle. Employing their estimate for the households in the decentralized OLG and the observationally equivalent ILA economy we find ρ H = 1.9% as opposed to ρ R = 4.2%. Then, a social planner equipped with the corresponding household preferences would go along with a steady state interest rate r ⋆ = ρ H + ξ σ = 1.9% + 2% 1.5 = 3.2% rather than r ⋆ = 5.5%. Such a 2.3% difference in the social discount rate in the cost benefit analysis of climate change has a major effect on the social costs of carbon and optimal abatement efforts. 16 Finally, let us give a numerical example adopting the wide-spread assumption of logarithmic utility (σ = 1) which is also used in the Stern (2007) review. Interestingly, we find ρ H = 0.1%, which is precisely the rate chosen for the ILA model in the Stern (2007) review.
We have pointed out above that the positive approach does not avoid implicit normative assumptions. These assumptions are important when the ILA model, which is calibrated to match decentralized market equilibria, is used for policy recommendations. In this paragraph, we compare the ILA model to our full-fletched model of the unconstrained utilitarian planner developed in section 5.1, which makes normative assumptions explicit.
Such a comparison is justified by Proposition 7 asserting that both models give rise to observationally equivalent equilibria. From Proposition 8 we know that, if we make the OLG structure explicit and calibrate the unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy to the decentralized unregulated market equilibrium, the condition ρ S > ρ H has to hold. 17 Therefore, interpreting an ILA economy that reflects the decentralized market equilibrium as an observationally equivalent utilitarian OLG economy necessarily involves the assumption that the intergenerational time preference rate of the social planner is higher than individual time preference rate. This assumption stands in sharp contrast to most of the literature on intergenerational ethics.
16 Having chosen T = 50 years in our simulation is based on the assumption that T is the time an individual is active in the market rather than actual life time. To illustrate the sensitivity with respect to the time horizon let us consider T = 75 instead. Then, for σ H = σ R = .5 we still find a negative rate of pure time preference ρ H = −1.6% and using σ H = σ R = 1.5 we obtain ρ H = 3.1% as opposed to ρ R = 4.2%. This results in r ⋆ = 3.1% + 2% 1.5 = 4.4% rather than r ⋆ = 5.5%. 17 Note that the social welfare function (27b) we considered does not include any preferences for smoothing lifetime utility of different generations over time. Of course, such functional forms are conceivable but it is not clear whether and how such a utilitarian OLG economy translates into an observationally equivalent ILA economy.
The normative approach
The normative approach to social discounting aims at treating all generations alike and, therefore, argues that a positive rate of time preference is non-ethical. This view is supported by a number of authors including Ramsey (1928) , Pigou (1932 ), Harrod (1948 , Koopmans (1965) , Solow (1974) , Broome and Schmalensee (1992) and intratemporal generational equity to the social planner whenever households exhibit a positive rate of pure time preference. It is, therefore, not obvious which type of generational equity the aim of 'treating all generations alike' should refer to.
Third, apart from the question whether consumption discrimination by age is justified on ethical grounds, it is questionable whether it is implementable. In Proposition 9 we
show that, in general, a social planner whose policy instruments are limited to non-agediscriminating taxes and subsidies cannot implement the first-best solution. In fact, the first-best social optimum can only be achieved in the special case that it coincides with the outcome of the decentralized OLG economy without any regulatory intervention.
Thus, the ILA economy, interpreted as an unconstrained social planner model, cannot capture this second best aspect of optimal policies.
Conclusions
Although the lifetime of individuals is finite, intergenerational trade-offs are most often discussed within ILA frameworks, which are interpreted as a utilitarian social welfare function. In this paper, we analyzed to what extend this interpretation is justified, in particular, if we assume a non-operative bequest motive.
We examined under which conditions an ILA economy is observationally equivalent to (i) a decentralized OLG economy and (ii) an OLG economy in which a social planner maximizes a utilitarian welfare function. We found that preference parameters differ in the decentralized OLG and the observationally equivalent ILA economy. In general, pure 20 This assumption seems particularly reasonable if ρ S is close to zero. With respect to the Stern review, it implies that the individual households' time preference rates exceed ρ S = 0.1%.
time preference of an ILA planner is higher than pure time preference of the households in the observationally equivalent OLG economy. Moreover, in a normative setting, a utilitarian social planner faces a trade-off between intergenerational and intragenerational equity that cannot be captured in the ILA model. Finally, even if the optimal intertemporal allocation of the economy's aggregates coincide between the ILA economy and the utilitarian social planner controlling an OLG economy, the limited implementability of the first best allocation can only be observed and discussed in the OLG context. We applied our results to the recent dispute between Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2007) in the discussion on the mitigation of climate change and concluded that the ILA model cannot adequately address important aspects of intergenerational trade-offs. In consequence, we argue to explicitly consider the generations' life cycles.
Our analysis employs two central assumptions. First, we assume selfish individual households. Although several empirical studies suggest that altruistic bequest motives are rather weak, extending the model to include different degrees of altruism is an interesting venue for future research. Second, part of our analysis assumes a specific utilitarian social welfare function. Although commonplace in the literature, this assumption drives some of our results, such as the trade-off between intra-and intergenerational equity.
In particular, discounted utilitarianism in general has been questioned as an appropriate approach to deal with questions of intergenerational equity (e.g., Asheim and Mitra forthcoming). It will be interesting to explore how other welfare functions relate to the one we have chosen and to the standard ILA model.
where k(r) = f ′ −1 (r), which is well defined due to the strict monotonicity of f ′ (k).
Observe that k ′ (r) = 1/f ′′ k(r) . The derivative of F with respect to r yields:
We seek a steady state interest rate r ⋆ . Under the assumption r ⋆ = r gr it is a solution of the equation
To analyze the case r = r gr respectively k = k gr we can define φ(k) continuously by
where we use l'Hospital's rule (recognizing that J f ′ (k gr ) = 1). For the extended domain we find that equation (A.4) becomes
Thus for r = r gr we have a steady state if J ′ (r gr ) = F ′ (r gr ) rather than when J (r) = F (r) as for all other interest rates.
Coming back to equation (A.5) we find for r = r gr ≡ ν + ξ that
We can distinguish three different cases depending on whether F ′ (r gr ) is (i) equal, (ii) smaller or (iii) greater than J ′ (r gr ).
As shown in the preceding paragraph, in this case there exists a steady state k ⋆ = k gr .
(
In this case, there exists a steady state k ⋆ > k gr and r ⋆ < r gr (inefficient steady state),
Note that lim r→0 f k(r) /k(r) = 0 because f is strictly concave and satisfies Inada conditions. Because of equation (A.11) the F (r) curve has to cross the J(r) curve from below somewhere in the interval (0, r gr ). The intersection defines r ⋆ and, thus, k ⋆ .
In this case, J(r) < F (r) for r > r gr in a sufficiently small neighborhood around r gr . We
show that there exists r ⋆ > r gr such that J(r) crosses F (r) from below at r = r ⋆ . First, we show that
We know from part (iii) and (v) of Lemma 2 that
In addition, we obtain for
. (A.14)
The sign of the underbraced term holds as the numerator goes to +∞, f ′′ k(r) < 0 and f k(r) − (ν + ξ)k(r) goes to +0. Thus the limit of the first term lies between −∞ and 0. Thus, a sufficient condition for (A.12) to hold is .17) and, in consequence, there exists a finite r = r ⋆ where J(r) crosses F (r) from below.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Given that condition (15) holds, we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that there exists a steady state with
As q ′ (r) > 0 due to part (v) of Lemma 1, condition (A.18) holds if and only if (17) 
The second line holds, as F (r) = J(r) for all r = r ⋆ . A sufficient condition for (A.19) to hold is that d dr .20) >From part (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 2 we know that the second condition holds for all r > r gr if, in case that σ > 1, also condition (18b) holds.
>From the second to the third line we employed F (r) = J(r) for all r = r ⋆ . We show in the following that g ′ 1 (r) ≤ 0 and g ′ 2 (r) ≥ 0 are sufficient for
on r ∈ (r rg , ∞) because of part (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 2 and J (r gr ) = 1, this implies
Second, we show that
In addition, we know that g 1 (r) > 0 for all r > 0 and
The latter implies together with equation (A.22)
equals zero at r = r gr and is monotonically increasing in r for g ′ 2 (r) ≥ 0 = 0, this implies that F ′ (r)/F (r)| r=r ⋆ > 0 for all r ⋆ > r gr . Then, we obtain
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We show that σ(r ⋆ − ρ H ) − ξ > 0 is a necessary condition for aggregate assets b ⋆ to be strictly positive in a dynamically efficient steady state, i.e., (σ H , ρ H ) ∈ Γ Ψ,T . As b ⋆ = k ⋆ holds, this implies that for k ⋆ > 0 the steady state real interest rate must exceed ρ H + ξ σ .
The household's wealth, as given by equation (13b), can be re-written to yield
Assuming a dynamically efficient steady states implies that r ⋆ − ξ > 0 and we obtain from (A.27) 
For σ(r ⋆ −ρ H )−ξ < 0, θ < 1 holds, which implies that 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Both economies exhibit the same technology and rate of population growth by assumption and, thus, the market equilibria on the capital and the labor market imply that the equations of motion for the aggregate capital per effective labor (22c) and (10b) coincide. The remaining difference in the macroeconomic system dynamics is governed by the Euler equations (10a) and (22a) and by the transversality condition (21).
"⇒": Suppose the two economies are observationally equivalent, i.e., coincidence in the initial levels of consumption and capital imply coincidence at all future times. For this to hold the Euler equations (10a) and (22a) have to coincide giving rise to (23).
"⇐": If condition (23) holds, then also the Euler equations (10a) and (22a) coincide and the system dynamics of both economies is governed by the same system of two ordinary first order differential equations. The solution is uniquely determined by some initial conditions on c and k. Thus, if the two economies coincide in the levels of consumption and capital at one point in time they also do so for all future times. In consequence, the two economies are observationally equivalent. Moreover, the capital stock is an equilibrium of Γ ⋆ implying k ⋆ < k gr . As a consequence, the transversality condition for the ILA economy is satisfied and, thus, the described path is indeed an optimal solution.
(ii) Let r ⋆ be the steady state interest rate of Γ ⋆ . Thus, all combinations of ρ R , σ R which satisfy which is equivalent to equation (26).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The optimization problem (29) 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
(i) The equivalence of the unconstrained social planner problem and of the optimization problem in the ILA economy pointed out in relation to equations (32) and (33) If σ R = σ H and ρ H = ρ S hold, the equivalence of the two problems was explained in relation to equations (32) and (33).
(ii) Existence of an observationally equivalent ILA economy implies that, first, the ILA economy has to be in a steady state as well and, second, that the steady state Euler equations have to coincide implying
The same reasoning applies when starting from the ILA economy steady state and assuming an observationally equivalent unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy.
If equation (34) Using equation (34) to substitute ρ S on the right hand side yields
Thus, also the ILA economy is in a steady state (see Section 3) with coinciding interest rate. As the interest rates coincide, so does the capital stock and so do the consumption paths. Starting with the ILA steady state with interest rate r R yields a coinciding unconstrained utilitarian OLG steady state by the same procedure.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
(i) According to the proof of Proposition 7, the Euler equation of the unconstrained social planner solution is (A.38). In a steady state with interest rate r ⋆ it is satisfied for any (obviously non-empty) set of preference parameters σ H and ρ S satisfying
Moreover, by virtue of Proposition 3, ρ S = r ⋆ − ξ σ H > ρ H holds. Note that for all decentralized economies Γ ⋆ r ⋆ < r gr . Hence, the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4 can be applied to make sure that the budget constraints of the decentralized OLG and the unconstrained utilitarian social planner OLG coincide. The condition r ⋆ < r gr also implies that the social planner's transversality condition is satisfied.
(ii)
